Entry into a network industry is modeled focusing on consumers' expectations formation through higher order beliefs. Equilibrium expectations are endogenous and depend on prices, acting as a coordination device among consumers. The model is able to account for aggressive pricing policies by the incumbent and by the entrant. Both exclusion and entry are possible outcomes (depending on parameter values). The threat of entry is beneficial to consumers, even when unsuccessful.
Introduction
In 1997, the London Stock Exchange slashed its fees by more than 60% to face competition with the new entrant Tradepoint/Virt-x. In 2004, LSE in turn created a new market segment (DTS-LSE) aimed at attracting trades on Dutch shares: the incumbent Euronext reacted by lowering its fees by up to 50%. 1 In both cases, the incumbent was able to fully retain its dominant position, and to do that it was ready to cut prices by a dramatic amount. As a consequence, the threat of entry has been quite beneficial for users, despite the inability of the entrants to succeed. These couple of examples raise some interesting questions. Why were the entrants unable to attract even a small fraction of trades? Why were the incumbents ready to cut their prices by such a large extent? The answer relies in "market tipping": trades concentrate in one trading venue, so as to maximize liquidity. Thus all traders either stay with the incumbent or shift to the entrant. This implies that it is very difficult for the entrant to steal liquidity. However the whole market share is at stake: this explains an aggressive reaction by the incumbent.
Stock exchanges are networks, as are many other sectors of the economy. To analyze the issue illustrated by the above examples, a model of entry into a network industry is presented. As it is well known, this model may admit multiple equilibria, due to self-fulfilling expectations: exogenous beliefs determine who is the winner of the game − either the incumbent or the entrant. The present work contributes to the literature by deepening the analysis of expectations formation. Consumers are assumed to enter the game with heterogenous beliefs; then expectations converge as consumers build up their higher order beliefs. 3 Firms are able to influence this convergence process, since equilibrium expectations are endogenous and depend on prices. So prices act as a coordination device among buyers.
A second novelty in my approach is that the entrant may be able to attract 1 For detailed information, see Di Noia (1999) Morris and Shin (2001). all consumers. To the contrary, in the industrial organization literature the incumbent is generally assumed to have an installed base of "old" buyers, so the entrant may attract only a "new generation" of buyers; 4 this is equivalent to assuming infinite switching costs. While this assumption is convenient for other sectors where switching costs may be quite low, like services (e.g. payments, media, stock exchanges). To capture this feature in a simple way, the model presented here will focus on two service providers and it will completely abstract from switching costs.
Of course, both assumptions − either infinite or zero switching costs − are extreme ones, useful for analytical purposes; concrete cases often are somewhere in between. In particular, assuming finite switching costs would lead to a weaker result, namely that the entrant may be able to attract some consumers, not all of them. The possibility of coexisting networks could also arise by introducing the ability of suppliers to differentiate their products.
On the one hand, the entrant is assumed to be more efficient: he has a lower cost of production. On the other hand, consumers' expectations might favor the incumbent, who has reached a critical mass of customers in the past. The outcome of the game is the following. If the incumbent is favored by an expectations bias, large enough to compensate for his cost disadvantage, he is able to deter entry by lowering his price below the monopoly level. If the expectations bias is lower, the entrant is able to attract all buyers by undercutting the incumbent price. So the model is able to account for aggressive pricing policies, which increase consumers' welfare even in the case of entry deterrence.
5
After introducing the model set-up (section 2), I show the multiple equilibria result (section 3). This is the starting point for the main contribution of the paper, which is the equilibrium selection through higher order beliefs (section 4). The conditions, determining either exclusion or entry, are shown in section 5. Policy implications are derived is Section 6. Section 7 summarizes the main results. All proofs are in the Appendix. 4 See Farrell and Saloner (1986) , Katz and Shapiro (1986, 1992) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2005) , Karlinger and Motta (2007), Cabral (2008) . 5 Other models (some are quoted in the previous footnote) provide a similar result; but in none of them this arises from the role of prices in coordinating expectations. the analysis of durable goods and technology adoption, it is not realistic for 2 Set-up Let us consider a one-period model. There are two firms: the incumbent monopolist (I) and the entrant (E); they offer two (not compatible) network services. Both I and E have already paid any sunk costs of entry, so these are irrelevant for their current decisions. The unit cost of production is zero for E and c ∈ (0, 1] for I.
All consumers have been buying the service provided by I until yesterday. In the current period − which we focus on − they can choose between continuing doing so or shifting to E: their decision space is given by d ∈ {I, E}. Depending on his choice, a consumer's surplus is going to be
where q d is the number of people − over total − buying from the same provider he buys from, at price p d . The total size of the market is normalized to 1: q I + q E = 1, and q I (q E ) is the market share of I (E).
6 Suppliers E and I make a binding announcement: a price p E ∈ [0, 1] and a price p I ∈ [c, 1] respectively. Then consumers simultaneously make their decisions and buy; we label this stage (consumers' decisions, given prices) as the "game among buyers". A buyer compares the expected surplus from staying with the incumbent with the one he gets by shifting to the entrant:
e " stands for "expectation"). So the optimal decision of a buyer (denoted by d * ) is determined by the following rule:
e E (unless otherwise stated, in case of indifference the tie-breaking rule is:
. For the game among buyers, a Nash equilibrium with fulfilled expectations (hereafter "equilibrium") is described by a quantity q * I , such that q I = q * I and q e I = q * I for all buyers (i.e. d * = I for a relative number of buyers q * I , which is equal to everybody's expectation). Let's define p ≡ p I − p E ; given the above assumptions, the only feasible values of p are in the interval [c − 1, 1].
All the above assumptions are common knowledge.
Lemma 1 highlights the well known multiple equilibria result.
Lemma 1 For any feasible value of p, there exist two equilibria of the game among buyers, where q * I = 1 and q * I = 0 respectively.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple. Since all buyers share the same preferences and − in equilibrium − the same expectations, all of them must behave the same way. Therefore, the only candidate equilibrium points are the extremes: either q * I = 1 or q * I = 0. They are indeed equilibria: one where the incumbent retains the whole market, and the other one where the entrant is able to attract all buyers. Self-fulfilling expectations are crucial in determining which of the two equilibria prevails. If all buyers believe that all of them are going to stay with the incumbent, then the optimal individual strategy is to do so. If the opposite expectation is shared among consumers, all of them will shift to the entrant.
Note that for all possible levels of the price difference p, both equilibria exist; as a consequence, either the incumbent or the entrant is able to cover the whole market even by setting his price at the monopoly level (1). This outcome is at odds with reality, where one observes incumbents react to entry threats by lowering prices, and entrants applying "penetrating" (undercutting) prices. Finally, coordination failures are possible, for example when p > 0 and q * I = 1.
The game among buyers − higher order beliefs
First order beliefs, which (in general) are not equilibrium beliefs, are defined as follows. Each buyer enters the game attaching a probability α to the equilibrium where q * I = 1 (and (1 − α) to the alternative equilibrium). The (exogenous) cross-sectional density of first order beliefs is f (α), with support α ∈ [0, 1]; the c.d.f. is F (α), with F (1) = 1. A consumer's α is his own initial assessment about the relative strength of the two competing networks: quality, technical features, and advertising are supposed to have a relevant impact on that. Differences across consumers do not necessarily reflect differential information; they might simply arise from different ways to process the same information. Each consumer knows his own value of α, while he does not observe other individual values; the aggregate distribution F (α) is common knowledge.
Higher order beliefs are formed by combining this information with the prices announced by the two suppliers, through the following steps (where the sequence is logical, rather than chronological):
-stage 1: buyers form their first order beliefs; -stage 2: firms (simultaneously) announce prices; -stage 3: buyers form their higher order beliefs and one equilibrium is selected.
The crucial assumption is that prices are announced at an interim stage. On the one hand, this captures the fact that firms retain some flexibility in price setting: they are able to react to an initial state of consumers' beliefs.
On the other hand, consumers are able to exploit the information about prices to form their equilibrium expectations. Let's continue here to focus on the game among buyers (stage 3).
Proposition 1 For any c.d.f. F (α) of first order beliefs, the unique equilibrium of the game among buyers is q *
; otherwise the unique equilibrium is q * I = 0.
Proposition 1 highlights that the price difference p is crucial to determine which equilibrium prevails. For example, by observing an aggressive pricing policy of the entrant, a consumer may be induced to believe that the new network service is going to be a success, and that other people will share this belief with him and join the new network; then he will join too. Thus prices play the role of a coordination device among consumers.
Intuitively, the process of expectations formation − which drives the proof of the proposition − goes as follows. Each buyer enters the game with an expectation given by his own first order belief: q e I = α. Then he computes a second order expectation, by considering the first order expectations of other consumers, and he finds that consumers buying from I are those for which α ≥ . Then each buyer computes his third order expectation, by considering the second order expectations of others; now he finds that, if p ≤ 1 − 2F ¡ 1+p 2 ¢ , buying from the incumbent gives all consumers a higher surplus than buying from the entrant. This is known by everybody, so expectations further converge to q e I = 1, supporting the equilibrium where q * I = 1. If the opposite inequality holds, expectations converge to q e I = 0, supporting the equilibrium where q e I = 0. In either case, the process of expectations formation converges at the level of third order beliefs; that's why it is not necessary to go any further.
Corollary 1 For any c.d.f. F (α) of first order beliefs, there is a unique p ∈ (−1, 1), defined by equation (1), such that: the unique equilibrium of the game among buyers is q * I = 1 iff p ≤ p; otherwise the unique equilibrium is q * I = 0.
Corollary 1 shows that, for given aggregate distribution of first order beliefs, there is a threshold level p (the unique solution to equation 1) such that the incumbent (the entrant) is going to be the "winner" of the game among buyers − servicing the whole market − if p ≤ p (p > p). The value of p depends on the distribution of first order beliefs in the following way.
Proposition 2 Let F (α) and G(α) be two c.d.f. of first order beliefs, such that F (α) ≤ G(α) for any α ∈ [0, 1] . Let p be defined by equation (1) and b p be defined by equation (2). Then it is p ≥ b p.
Let me show the implications of Proposition 2 by means of an example.
Example 1 Let f(α) = 2α and g(α) = 1. Then we have:
. By using equations (1) and (2) respectively, the following values are computed: p ≈ 0.24 and b p = 0.
Example 1 highlights an important point. If the distribution of first order beliefs is uniform, then the threshold level for the price difference between incumbent and entrant is zero. The uniform distribution is "neutral": the heterogenous beliefs of consumers − as to which firm is going to win competition − do not create any competitive advantage for one of them. If this is the case, the supplier announcing the lower price is able to attract the critical mass of buyers and consequently to cover the whole market. In the end, the game among suppliers would turn out to be much like a competition à la Bertrand.
This result provides a natural way to model the competitive advantage typically enjoyed by the incumbent in a network industry. Remember that I was the only supplier before the current period − i.e. before E would try to enter the market. In other words, the entrant is trying to challenge the dominant position of a supplier who has already reached his critical mass. It is then reasonable to assume that consumers' expectations are not neutral; to the contrary, they are biased in favor of the incumbent. If this is the case, then p > 0, and the incumbent is able to retain his position even with p I > p E − provided the difference is not too large. This point is formalized in the following corollary, where the aggregate distribution of first order beliefs is supposed to be biased in favor of the incumbent. 
The complete game: exclusion or entry
We now come to the decision problem of the two producers, namely which price to announce. Actually, in Proposition 3 the optimal strategies for both firms and consumers are specified, thus describing the Nash equilibrium of the complete game (stages 2 and 3 above).
Proposition 3 Let p ∈ [0, 1). The Nash equilibrium of the complete game is the following:
Proposition 3 shows that the outcome of the complete game depends on the value of p: it is crucial whether this threshold level for the price difference lies above or below the cost difference between incumbent and entrant (c). Suppose p ≥ c: by setting p I = p, the incumbent is able to avoid entry − even if the entrant announces the lowest possible price (zero) − and to enjoy a non-negative profit (π I = p − c). In doing so, he exploits his advantage in terms of consumers' expectations, which is so large as to overcome his cost disadvantage. This case points to a possible coordination failure among consumers, since the more efficient producer is prevented from entering the market, although he commits to charge a lower price than the incumbent. To the contrary, if p < c the entrant is able to successfully challenge the position of the incumbent and to enter the market: even if I announces a price as low as he can (p I = c), E can undercut the incumbent, cover the whole market and earn a positive profit (π E = c − p).
For the reason explained above, in Proposition 3 the bias (if any) in consumers' expectations is supposed to favor the incumbent (p ≥ 0). However, this does not necessarily allow him to retain his dominant position: his ability to exclude the entrant crucially depends on the magnitude of such advantage, relative to its cost disadvantage. Finally, note that if we allow for consumers' expectations to favor the entrant (p < 0), the unique equilibrium is that with entry, since it is trivially p < c. Intuitively, both competitive factors − expectations and production costs − go the same way and favor the entrant.
Welfare analysis and policy implications
Proposition 3 identifies two equilibria, one with exclusion and the other one with entry. The comparison between them shows that entry is preferable, Total surplus is equal to 1 in the entry equilibrium, since S E = 1 − p E and π E = p E . It is equal to 1 − c in the exclusionary equilibrium, since S I = 1 − p I and π I = p I − c. Thus the exclusion of the more efficient entrant entails a productive inefficiency, which reduces total welfare by c.
Consumers' surplus is at least as large as (1 − c) in case of entry: if p = 0, whatever welfare criterion is adopted: either total surplus (consumers' plus producers') or consumers' surplus only.
E is able to enter by setting p E = c; as p gets higher, E has to lower his price, possibly to p E = 0; thus S E ∈ [1 − c, 1]. To the contrary, consumers' surplus is at most as large as (1 − c) with exclusion: p I = p, where p ∈ [c, 1), so S I ∈ (0, 1 − c]. Therefore S E ≥ S I : consumers are better off with entry than without.
The exclusionary behavior of the incumbent is detrimental both for productive efficiency and for consumers' welfare. However, it is interesting to ask whether the entry threat, even when unsuccessful, is able to bring some welfare improvement. The answer is negative, if we look at total surplus: this is equal to 1−c in the exclusionary equilibrium and in the monopoly equilibrium as well (absent any entry threat). But the answer is positive if we focus on consumers: the incumbent monopolist − absent any threat of entry − charges a price equal to 1, extracting the whole consumers' surplus; to the contrary, in order to exclude an entrant he has to lower his price below such level, to the benefit of consumers. So, from consumers' perspective, the equilibrium with exclusion is worse than that with entry, but it is better than a monopoly without any threat of entry.
The last result may be relevant for merger policy. In the context analyzed here, the merger between the incumbent and another firm − currently operating in a different geographic/product market − should be carefully considered by the antitrust authorities. In particular, a condition for authorization should be that the merger does not eliminate all significant threats of entry into the incumbent's market, even if entry is not likely to be successful.
An example, where the above criterion has been applied, is the Report by the UK Competition Commission (2005), relative to the proposed mergers between the London Stock Exchange and either Euronext or the Deutsche Borse. The horizontal mergers have not been judged able to lessen competition in the market for trading services on UK shares, since other potential entrants remain. However, the authorization has been subordinated to the implementation of (structural and behavioral) remedies, aimed at removing the vertical control of both Euronext and DB over their post-trading infrastructures: such vertical control has been judged able to jeopardize competition in the trading sector (through foreclosure). This position of the UK CC relies on the assumption that, despite the observation of several failed entries, the entry threat is a valuable source of competitive pressure in this industry.
Concluding remarks
The model presented is able to show that firms make a substantial contribution, through their pricing policies, in determining which equilibrium prevails, following the decision of an entrant firm to challenge the dominant position of an incumbent in a network industry. Starting from an initial (outof-equilibrium) set of exogenous heterogeneous expectations, prices act as a coordination device in the process of expectations convergence, where consumers try to forecast which firm will eventually reach its critical mass; thus equilibrium (homogenous) expectations are endogenous. While expectations may be driven by a number of factors (e.g. quality, advertising), this work has focussed on prices. For example an incumbent, by reacting aggressively to an entry threat, might be able to convince his own customers that he will be able to retain his customer base, and this belief becomes self-fulfilling.
The incumbent possibly enjoys an advantage, in terms of consumers' initial expectations, but this does not necessarily allow him to retain his dominant position: his ability to exclude the entrant crucially depends on the magnitude of such advantage, relative to its cost disadvantage. On the one hand, exclusion requires the incumbent to lower his price below the monopoly level − the one he would select absent any entry threat. On the other hand, the entrant may be successful only by undercutting the incumbent's price by a sufficiently large amount. So the model is able to account for aggressive pricing policies, commonly observed when an incumbent and an entrant compete for the market.
Welfare analysis shows that both productive efficiency and consumers' welfare are hurt by exclusion. However, consumers benefit from the threat of entry, even when entry is not successful. Thus a merger resulting in the elimination of any potential entrant should not be allowed by the antitrust authorities.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let q . In the first case, we obtain: S e I ≥ S e E → q I = 1. In the second case, we obtain: S e I < S e E → q I = 0. In both cases it is q e I 6 = q I , hence q e I ∈ (0, 1) cannot be an equilibrium expectation. 
